Archive for freedom
Happy Texas Independence Day!
Posted by: | CommentsToo bad they didn’t stay that way. Oh well, today we Remember the Alamo!
The Texas Declaration of Independence
The Unanimous Declaration of Independence made by the Delegates of the People of Texas in General Convention at the town of Washington on the 2nd day of March 1836.
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Tags: Austin, freedom, government, history, individualism, Texas
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Mises Circle Houston Recap
Posted by: | CommentsI’ve been reticent to post a recap of Mises Circle Houston because I didn’t have any photos of the event until yesterday. But now, everything is here and I’m happy to tell you a little about it… First off, I need to send a great big THANK YOU to Jeffrey Davis, the conference sponsor, and the entire staff of the Mises Institute for their amazing service – Kristy, Norma, Pat, Chad, and Willard. We love you guys!!!
Our group from the Libertarian Longhorns (and Robert Butler, executive director of LP-Texas) left Austin around 6am on Saturday, January 23, to make sure we arrived in time to get a decent seat. Robert volunteered his vehicle, and so I didn’t have to drive. We talked up the LP’s plans and upcoming events on the drive to Houston and back.
Upon arrival, we had the privilege to meet some really neat people. I happened to run across a few LCC readers as well, like Yvonne Kelly (on the far left of the group picture). Tom Woods said hello as he walked in, and I briefly spoke with Lew Rockwell as well while drinking some coffee.
The theme of the day was "the failure of Keynesianism" — appropriate considering our current political situation, wouldn’t you say? Doug French was the first speaker. For some reason I have lost my notes, but his topic was "Bank Failures in a Keynesian World." What was most interesting to me about his talk was the striking parallels of the circumstances preceding "the lost decade" and the circumstances we are now experiencing in the United States. One can only hope that failed policies would be remembered, but alas and alack it’s politics not wisdom that we deal with.
Tom Woods spoke about "Keynesian Predictions vs. American History." Did you know that as World War 2 was coming to a close, policy makers were concerned that the soldiers coming home would overwhelm the economy and that a new depression would ensue. How wrong they were: 1946 was the single greatest year for the American economy ever. I also enjoyed his ransacking of Paul Samuelson and Paul Krugman.
Before lunch we enjoyed hearing the beloved Congressman Ron Paul. His principal point was simply that a true revolution is philosophic in nature. This is most certainly true, and the Austrian School of Economics is at the forefront of this change. Dr. Paul touched on many topics, but as he likes to do he focused on monetary policy and foreign policy. He made specific mention of the importance of auditing the Federal Reserve. He said that once audited, two well-kept secrets will be brought into the open once again: (1) that the Fed frequently bails out friends via the discount window (Fed short term loans), and (2) that the Fed has many international activities unaccounted for. Thus, we find monetary policy is also connected to foreign policy as well. Call me conspiratorial if you must, but the CIA’s funding goes beyond Congress – it’s tied to the Fed as well. Best quote from Ron: "Quite frankly, in a Constitutional Republic, you would not have a CIA."
Lew Rockwell was our final speaker for the day on "Economics and Moral Courage." He noted that although in many ways we are quite free (such as the freedom of the internet), we are also having much freedom taken away from us little by little. Moreover, as more freedom is stolen from us, people are more frequently not able to envision how freedom actually works. They simply do not have experience in understanding cause and effect. In truth, this is due to the "banality of evil," something small that ekes its way into public life. For example, the acceptance of a wrong premise about the role of government in life can be a first step toward more and more government control, leading finally to totalitarianism. What begins with banality, ends in bloodshed.
Overall, I’d say it was a great day…
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Tags: Austrian School, economics, free market, free society, freedom, history, keynesianism, Mises Institute, Ron Paul
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Freedom and Majority Rule
Posted by: | CommentsBy Edmund Opitz
Lord Northcliffe, the publisher of the London Times, came to this country a few years after World War I. A banquet in his honor was held in New York City, and at the appropriate time he rose to his feet to propose a toast. Prohibition was in effect, you will recall, and the beverage customarily drunk by Northcliffe in his homeland was not available here. So Northcliffe raised his glass of water and said: “Here’s to America, where you do as you please. And if you don’t, they make you!”
Here, in this land of the free, “we” as voters had amended the Constitution to punish conduct which “we”-as consumers-had been enjoying. If you point out that the 18th Amendment had been inserted into the Constitution by majority vote, and that therefore “we” had done it to “ourselves,” you need to be reminded that the “we” who did it were not the same people as the “ourselves” to whom it was done!
The 18th Amendment was repealed by passage of the 21st Amendment in 1933. Shortly thereafter another prohibition law was passed, this one a prohibition against owning gold. Under the earlier dispensation you could walk down the street with a pocketful of gold coins without breaking the law; but if you were caught carrying a bottle of whiskey you might be arrested. Then the legal switcheroo occurred, and you could carry all the whiskey you wanted, but if you had any gold in your pocket you could be thrown in jail!
Our scientists are exploring outer space looking for intelligent life on other planets. I hope they find some, because there’s none to spare on planet Earth! With how little wisdom do we organize our lives, especially in the areas of government and the economy. We’ve been going by dead reckoning for too long, and our dumb luck has just about run out.
Our present subject is political philosophy. This is a complex subject, so we shall do no more than ponder the first step. The big question in any serious theory of politics is to decide what’s political and what’s private. In a totalitarian nation there is no sector of life which is intrinsically private; the whole of life is politicized. The State controls economic life; there is a State Church; there is a controlled press; the schools are all run by government. Big Brother oversees every activity. When people in such a nation decide to move in the direction of a free society, they do so by carving private sectors out of what had hitherto been 100 percent public.
You’re all familiar with the division of society into the private, voluntary sector, in contrast to the public, governmental, coercive sector; and you know that “the history of liberty is the history of the limitations placed upon governmental power.” It is obvious that the more things the law commands you to do the fewer the things you may do freely, on your own initiative. If the public, governmental sector extends over 50 percent of the society, this means that the people of this society, are half free and half unfree. We become freer only as we limit government to its proper competence. But what is government’s proper competence?
In the 18th century they put the question as follows: What shall be the extent of rule? This is the fundamental, primordial question in political philosophy, but we’d phrase it differently. What are the functions appropriate to the political agency? we would ask. What is the role of the law? What tasks should be assigned to Washington or some lesser governmental agency, and in what sectors of life should people be free to pursue their own goals? When should legal coercion be used to force a person to do something against his will?
What Functions Are Appropriate?
In the light of government’s nature, what functions may we appropriately assign to it? This is the question, and there are two ways to approach it. The approach favored today is to count noses -find out what a majority of the people want from government, and then elect politicians who will give it to them! And believe me, they’ve been giving it to us!
The other approach, the one favored by our ancestors, was to think about the matter, employing relevant intellectual and moral considerations in order to decide what the law should and should not do. The backbone of every legal system is a set of prohibitions, a series of “Thou Shalt Not’s.” The law forbids certain actions and punishes those who persist in them, so we need to know what actions should be forbidden. Our moral code prescribes what not to do, so the solid core of any legal system is the moral code, which, in our culture is conveyed to us by the Mosaic Law: the Ten Commandments. The Sixth Commandment of The Decalogue says: “Thou shalt not commit murder,” and this moral imperative against murder is built into every statute which prescribes punishment for homicide. The Eighth Commandment says: “Thou shalt not steal,” and this moral norm gives rise to laws punishing theft.
There is a moral law against murder because each human life is precious; and there is a moral law against theft because rightful property is an extension of the person. “A possession,” Aristotle writes, “is an instrument for maintaining life.” Deprive a person of the right to own property and for his own survival he has to become the property of someone else-a slave. The master-slave relation is a violation of the rightful order of things, the rightful order being individual liberty and voluntary association.
The Gift of Life
We’ve taken care of the right to life and the right to property; what about liberty? Reflect on the fact that every human being has the gift of life, and each of us is charged with the primary responsibility of bringing his own life to completion. Each one of us is also a steward of the earth’s scarce resources, which we must use wisely and economically. In short, we are responsible beings. But no person can be held responsible for the way he lives his life and conserves his property, unless he is free. Responsibility-Freedom; two sides of one coin. Liberty, therefore, is a necessary corollary to Life and Property. Our forebears regarded Life, Liberty, and Property as natural rights, and the importance of these basic rights was stressed again and again in the oratory, the preaching, and the writings of the 18th century. Life, Liberty, and Property are potent ideas because they transcribe into words an important aspect of the way things are.
Our ancestors founded their legal and moral codes on the nature of things, on what they believed to be real-just as students of the natural sciences frame their scientific laws to describe the way things behave. For example: physical bodies throughout the universe attract one another; the attraction increases with the mass of the attracting bodies and diminishes with the square of the distance between them. This has always been so, but it was Sir Isaac Newton who made some observations along these lines and gave us the law of gravitation. How come gravitational attraction varies as the inverse square of the distance, and not as the inverse cube? One is as thinkable as the other; but it just happens that the universe is prejudiced against the inverse-cube in this instance; precisely as this same universe is prejudiced against murder, has a strong bias in favor of property, and wills that men and women be free.
Immanuel Kant echoed an ancient sentiment when he declared that two things filled him with awe: the starry heavens without, and the moral law within. The precision and order in nature manifest the Author of nature, the Creator. The Creator is also the Author of our being and requires certain duties of us, his creatures. There is, thus, a reality outside of us joined to the reality within, and this twofold reality-inner and outer-has an intelligible pattern, a coherent structure. This dual arrangement is not made by human hands; it’s unchangeable, it’s not affected by our wishes, and it can’t be tampered with. It can, however, be misinterpreted, and it may be disobeyed. We consult certain portions of the exterior pattern and draw up blueprints for building a bridge. If we misinterpret, the bridge collapses. And a society disintegrates if its members disobey the configuration laid down in the nature of things for our guidance. This configuration is the moral order, as interpreted by reason and tradition.
The point, simply put, is that our forebears, when they wanted some clues for regulating their private and public lives, anchored their beliefs in a reality beyond society and superior to government. They thought their way through to the idea of a sacred order which overarches the world-the order of creation. They figured out that our duties within society reflect the mandates of this divine order.
Take a Poll
This view of one’s duty is quite in contrast to the method currently popular for determining what we should do politically, which is to conduct an opinion poll. Find out what the crowd wants, and then say, “Me too!” This is what the advice of certain political scientists boils down to. Here is Professor James MacGregor Burns, a self-professed liberal and the author of several highly touted books, including The Deadlock of Democracy and a biography of John F. Kennedy. Liberals play what Burns calls “the numbers game.” “As a liberal I believe in majority rule,” he writes. “I believe that the great decisions should be made by numbers.” In other words, don’t bother to think; just count! “What does a majority have a right to do?” he asks. And he answers his own question. “A majority has the right to do anything in the economic and social arena that is relevant to our national problems and national purposes.” And then, realizing the enormity of what he has just said, he backs off: ” . . . except to change the basic rules of the game.”
Burns’s final disclaimer sounds much like an afterthought, for some of his liberal cohorts support the idea of unqualified majority rule. The late Herman Finer, in his anti-Hayek book entitled Road to Reaction, declares “For in a democracy, right is what the majority makes it to be.” (p. 60) What we have here is an updating of the ancient “might makes right” doctrine. The majority does have more muscle than the minority, it has the power to carry out its will, and thus it is entitled to have its own way. If right is whatever the majority says it is, then whatever the majority does is O.K., by definition. Farewell, then, to individual rights, and farewell to the rights of minorities; the majority is the group that has made it to the top, and the name of the game is winner take all.
The dictionary definition of a majority is 50 percent plus 1. But if you were to draw up an equation to diagram modern majoritarianism it would read:
5,081,540,418 plus 1 = 100, 50 minus 1 = O
Amusing confirmation comes from a professor at Rutgers University, writing a letter to The Times. Several years ago considerable criticism was generated by the appointment of a certain man to a position in the national government. Such criticism is unwarranted, writes our political scientist, because the critics comprise “a public which, by virtue of having lost the last election, has no business approving or disapproving appointments by those who won.” This is a modern version of the old adage, “To the victor belong the spoils.” This Rutgers professor goes on to say, “Contrary to President Lincoln’s famous but misleading phrase, ours is not a government by the people, but government by government.” So there!
The Nature of Government
What functions may we appropriately assign to the political agency? What should government do? Today’s answer is that government should do whatever a majority wants a government to do; find out what the people want from government, and then give it to them. The older and truer answer is based upon the belief that the rules of living together in society may be discovered if we think hard and clearly about the matter and the corollary that we can conform our lives to these rules if we resolve to do so. But I have said nothing so far about the nature or essence of government.
Americans are justly proud of our nation, but this pride sometimes blinds us to reality. How often have you heard someone declare, “In America, ‘We’ are the government.” This assertion is demonstrably untrue; “we” are the society, all 250 million of us; but society and government are not at all the same entity. Society is all-of-us, whereas the government is
only some-of-us. The some-of-us who make up government would begin with the President, Vice-President, and Cabinet; it would include Congress and the bureaucracy; it would descend through governors, mayors and lesser officials, down to sheriffs and the cop on the beat.
A Unique Institution
Government is unique among all the institutions of society; society has bestowed upon this one agency, government, the exclusive right to use legal force in specified situations. Governments use persuasion and they employ advertising technicians and public relations experts. They invoke the symbols of authority, legitimacy, and tradition-as do institutions like the Church and the School. But only one agency has the power to tax; only one agency has the authority to operate the system of courts and jails; only one agency has a warrant for mobilizing the machinery for making war; and that is government, the power structure. Monarchy, aristocracy, democracy-it doesn’t matter. Governmental action is what it is, no matter what rationale might be offered to justify what it does. Government always acts with power; in the last resort government uses force to back up its decrees.
It is a truism that government is society’s legal agency of compulsion. Virtually every statesman and every political scientistwhether Left or Right-takes this for granted and does his theorizing from this as a base. “Government is not reason, it is not eloquence,” wrote George Washington; “it is force.” Bertrand Russell, in a 1916 book, said, “The essence of the State is that it is the repository of the collective force of its citizens.” Ten years later, Columbia University professor R. M. MacIver spoke of the state as “the authority which alone has compulsive power.” The English writer Alfred Cobban says that “the essence of the State, and of all political organizations, is power.”
But why belabor the obvious except for the fact that so many of our contemporaries-those who say “we are the government”-overlook it? What we are talking about here is the power of man over man; government is the legal authorization which permits some men to use force on others. Whenever we advocate a law to accomplish a certain goal, we advertise our inability to persuade people to act in the manner we recommend, so
we’re going to force them to conform! As Sargent Shriver once put it, “In a democracy you don’t compel people to do something, unless you are sure they won’t do it.”
In the liberal mythology of this century, government is all things to all men. Liberals think that government assumes whatever characteristics people wish upon it-like Proteus in Greek mythology who took on one shape after another, depending on the circumstances. But government is not an all-purpose tool; it has a specific nature, and the nature of government determines what government can accomplish. When properly limited, government uses lawful force to annul violence and redress injury, thus limited government serves a social end no other agency-call it what you will-can achieve. But when the proper limits are overstepped, a government’s use of force is destructive. The alternatives here are defensive force versus aggressive force; or law versus tyranny-as the Greeks would have put it. Here’s how Aeschylus saw it in his drama The Eumenides: “Let no man live uncurbed by law, nor curbed by tyranny.”
The Moral Code
If the political agency is to serve a moral end it must not violate the moral code. The moral code tells us that human life is sacred, that liberty is precious, and that ownership of property is good. And by the same token, this moral code supplies a definition of criminal action; murder is a crime, theft is a crime, and it is criminal to abridge any person’s lawful freedom. It is the essential function of government, then, in harmony with the moral code, to use lawful force against criminals in order that peaceful citizens may go about their business. The use of lawful force against criminals for the protection of the innocent is the earmark of a properly limited government. Standing in utter contrast is the State’s use of tyrannical force on peaceful citizens-whatever the excuse, or whatever the rationalization. It’s the contrast between defense and aggression, between the rule of law and oppression.
People should not be forced into conformity with any social blueprint; their private plans should not be overridden in the interests of some national plan or social goal. Government-the public power-should never be used for private advantage; it should not be used to protect people from themselves. Well, then, what should the law do to peaceful, innocent citizens? It should let ‘em alone! When government lets John Doe alone, and punishes anyone who refuses to let him alone, then John Doe is a free man.
In this country we have a republican form of government. The word “republic” is from the Latin words, res and publica, meaning the things or affairs which are common to all of us, the affairs which are in the public domain, in sharp contrast to matters which are private. Government, then, is “the public thing,” and this strong emphasis on public serves to delimit and set boundaries to governmental power, in the interest of preserving the integrity of the private domain.
What’s in a name? you might be thinking. Well, in this case, in the case of republic, a lot. The word “republic” encapsulates a political philosophy; it connotes the philosophy of government that would limit government to the defense of life, liberty, and property in order to serve the ends of justice. There’s no such connotation in the word “monarchy,” for example; or in aristocracy or oligarchy.
A monarch is the sole, supreme ruler of a country, and there is theoretically no area in the life of his citizens over which he may not hold sway. The king owns the country and his people belong to him. Monarchical practice pretty well coincided with theory in what is called “Oriental Despotism,” but in Christendom the power of the kings was limited by the nobility on the one hand, and the Emperor on the other; and all secular rulers had to take account of the power of the Papacy. Power was thus played off against power, to the advantage of the populace.
Individual Liberty
The most important social value in Western civilization, historically, is the idea of individual liberty. The human person was looked upon as God’s creature, gifted with free will which endows him with the capacity to choose what he will make of his life. This is our inner, spiritual freedom and it must be matched by an outer and social liberty if man is to fulfill his duty toward his Maker. Creatures of the state cannot achieve their destiny as human beings; therefore, government must be limited to securing and preserving freedom of personal action within the rules, and the rules must be designed to maximize liberty and opportunity for everyone.
Now, unless we are persuaded of the importance of freedom to the individual, it is obvious that we will not bother to structure government around him to protect his private domain and secure his rights. So, the idea of individual liberty is the key. This idea is as old as Christianity but it was given a tremendous boost in the 16th century by the Reformation and the Renaissance. The earliest manifestation of this renewed idea of individual liberty was in the area of religion, issuing in the conviction that every person should be allowed to worship God in his own way. This religious ferment in 16th-century England gave us Puritanism. Early in the 17th-century, Puritanism projected a political movement whose members were contemptuously called Whiggamores-later shortened to Whigs-a word roughly equivalent to “cattle thieves.” The king’s men were called Tories-”highway robbers.” The Whigs worked for individual liberty and progress; the Tories defended the old order of the king, the landed aristocracy, and the established church.
One of the great writers and thinkers in the Puritan and Whig tradition was John Milton, who wrote his celebrated plea for the abolition of Parliamentary censorship of printed material in 1644, Areopagitica. Many skirmishes had to be fought before freedom of the press was finally accepted as one of the earmarks of a free society. Free speech is a corollary of press freedom, and I remind you of the statement attributed to Voltaire: “I disagree with everything you say, but I will defend with my life your right to say it.”
Adam Smith extended freedom to the economic order with The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776 and warmly received in the thirteen colonies. The colonists had been practicing economic liberty for a long time, simply because their governments were too busy with other things to interfere-or too inefficient-and Adam Smith gave them a rationale.
Ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted in 1791. Article the First reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” The separation of Church and State enunciated here was a momentous first step in world history. Religious liberty, freedom of the press, free speech, and the free economy are four departments of the same liberating trend-the Whig movement.
The men we refer to as the Founding Fathers would have called themselves Whigs. Edmund Burke was the chief spokesman for a group in Parliament known as The Rockingham Whigs. In 1832 the Whig Party in England changed its name to one which more aptly described its emphasis on liberty. It became the Liberal Party, standing for free trade, religious liberty, the abolition of slavery, extension of the franchise and other reforms.
Classical Liberalism is not to be confused with the thing called “liberalism” in our time! Today’s “liberalism” is the exact opposite of historical Liberalism-which came out of the 18th-century Whiggismwhich came out of the 17th-century Puritanism. The labels are the same; the realities are utterly different. Present-day liberals have trouble with ideas as ideas, so they try to dispose of uncomfortable thoughts by pigeonholing them in a time slot. The ideas of individual liberty, inherent rights, limited government, and the free economy are dismissed by contemporary liberals as “18th-century ideas.” What a dumb comment! The proper test of an idea is the test of truth. Is the idea sound, does it hold water? You do not judge the quality of an idea by pigeonholing it in a particular time slot; you don’t dispose of an idea by relegating it to the historical period when the idea emerged and became influential. But this is a typical liberal tactic.
The Proper Role of Government
Our discussion has focused on the nature of government, and we have come to realize that government is society’s power structure constitutionally authorized to use legal force in certain last-resort situations. Once this truth sinks in we take the next step, which is to figure out what functions are properly assigned to the one social agency authorized to use force. This brings us back to the moral code and the primary values of life, liberty, and property. It is the function of the law to protect the life, liberty, and property of all persons alike in order that each human being has maximum opportunity to achieve his proper destiny. This is the thesis of Classical Liberalism, and I buy it.
There’s a second political question to resolve, tied in with the basic one, but much less important: How do you choose personnel for public office? Once you have employed the relevant intellectual and moral criteria and confined public things to the public sector, leaving the major concerns of life free in the private sector . . . once you’ve done this there’s still the matter of choosing people for public office. One method is choice by bloodline. If your father is king, and if you are the eldest son, why you’ll be king when the old man dies. Limited monarchy still has its advocates, and kingship will work if a people embrace the monarchical ideology. Monarchy hasn’t always worked smoothly, however, else what would Shakespeare have done for his plays? Sometimes your mother’s lover will bump off the old man, or your kid brother may try to poison you.
There’s a better way to choose personnel for public office: Let the people vote. Confine government within the limits dictated by reason and morals, lay down appropriate requirements for exercising the franchise, and then let voters go to the polls. The candidate who gets the majority of votes gets the job. This is democracy, and this is the right place for majority action. As Pericles put it 2,500 years ago, democracy is where the many participate in rule.
Voting today is little more than a popularity contest, and the most popular man is not necessarily the best man, just as the most popular idea is not always the soundest idea. It is obvious, then, that balloting-or counting noses or taking a sampling of public opinion-is not the way to get at the fundamental question of the proper role of government within a society. We have to think hard about this one, which means we have to assemble the evidence; weigh, sift, and criticize it; compare notes with colleagues, and so on. In other words, determining the proper role for government is an educational endeavor, a matter for the classroom, the study, the podium, the pulpit, the forum, the press. To count noses at this point is a cop out; there’s no place here for a Gallup Poll.
To summarize: The fundamental question in political philosophy has to do with the scope and functions of the political agency. Only hard thinking-education in the broad sense-can resolve this question. The lesser question has to do with the choice of personnel, and majority action-democratic decision-making-is the way to deal with it. But if we approach the first question with the mechanics appropriate to the second, we have confused the categories and we’re in for trouble.
“Democratic Despotism”
We began to confuse the categories more than a century and a half ago, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed. His book, Democracy in America, warned us about the emergence here of what he called “democratic despotism,” which would not shatter the wills of men, but merely soften and bend them. It would “degrade men without tormenting them.”
We were warned again in 1859 by a professor at Columbia University, Francis Lieber, in his book On Civil Liberty and Self-Government: “Woe to the country in which political hypocrisy first calls the people almighty, then teaches that the voice of the people is divine, then pretends to take a mere clamor for the true voice of the people, and lastly gets up the desired clamor.” Getting up the desired clamor is what we today call “social engineering,” or “the engineering of consent.” What is called “a majority” in contemporary politics is almost invariably a numerical minority, whipped up by an even smaller minority of determined and sometimes unscrupulous men. There’s not a single plank in the platform of the welfare state that was put there because of a genuine demand by a genuine majority. A welfarist government is always up for grabs; and various factions, pressure groups, special interests, causes, ideologies seize the levers of government in order to impose their programs on the rest of the nation. Formula for present-day liberalism: “Somebody’s program at everybody’s expense!”
Let’s assume that we don’t like what’s going on today in this and other countries; we don’t like it because people are being violated, as well as principles. We know the government is off the track, and we want to get it back on, but we know in our bones that Edmund Burke was right when he said, “There never was, for any long time . . . a mean, sluggish, careless people that ever had a good government of any form.” The politics of a nation reflects the character of a people, and you cannot improve the tone of politics except as you elevate the character of a significant number of persons. The improvement of character is the hard task of religion, ethics, art, and education. When we do our work properly in these areas, our public life will automatically respond.
Large numbers are not required. A small number of men and women whose convictions are sound and clearly thought out, who can present their philosophy persuasively, and who manifest their ideas by the quality of their lives . . . such people can inspire the multitude whose ideas are too vague to generate convictions one way or another. A little leaven raises the entire lump of dough; a small rudder turns a huge ship. And a handful of people possessed of ideas and a dream has got hold of the handle which can turn a nation around-especially a nation that is searching for new answers and a new direction.
Originally published in The Freeman, August 1992.
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Isaiah’s Job
Posted by: | Commentsby Albert Jay Nock
One evening last autumn, I sat long hours with a European acquaintance while he expounded a political-economic doctrine which seemed sound as a nut and in which I could find no defect. At the end, he said with great earnestness: “I have a mission to the masses. I feel that I am called to get the ear of the people. I shall devote the rest of my life to spreading my doctrine far and wide among the population. What do you think?”
An embarrassing question in any case, and doubly so under the circumstances, because my acquaintance is a very learned man, one of the three or four really first-class minds that Europe produced in his generation; and naturally I, as one of the unlearned, was inclined to regard his lightest word with reverence amounting to awe. Still, I reflected, even the greatest mind can not possibly know everything, and I was pretty sure he had not had my opportunities for observing the masses of mankind, and that therefore I probably knew them better than he did. So I mustered courage to say that he had no such mission and would do well to get the idea out of his head at once; he would find that the masses would not care two pins for his doctrine, and still less for himself, since in such circumstances the popular favourite is generally some Barabbas. I even went so far as to say (he is a Jew) that his idea seemed to show that he was not very well up on his own native literature. He smiled at my jest, and asked what I meant by it; and I referred him to the story of the prophet Isaiah.
It occurred to me then that this story is much worth recalling just now when so many wise men and soothsayers appear to be burdened with a message to the masses. Dr. Townsend has a message, Father Coughlin has one, Mr. Upton Sinclair, Mr. Lippmann, Mr. Chase and the planned economy brethren, Mr. Tugwell and the New Dealers, Mr. Smith and Liberty Leaguers – the list is endless. I can not remember a time when so many energumens were so variously proclaiming the Word to the multitude and telling them what they must do to be saved. This being so, it occurred to me, as I say, that the story of Isaiah might have something in it to steady and compose the human spirit until this tyranny of windiness is overpast. I shall paraphrase the story in our common speech, since it has to be pieced out from various sources; and inasmuch as respectable scholars have thought fit to put out a whole new version of the Bible in the American vernacular, I shall take shelter behind them, if need be, against the charge of dealing irreverently with the Sacred Scriptures.
The prophet’s career began at the end of King Uzziah’s reign, say about 740 B.C. This reign was uncommonly long, almost half a century, and apparently prosperous. It was one of those prosperous reigns, however – like the reign of Marcus Aurelius at Rome, or the administration of Eubulus at Athens, or of Mr. Coolidge at Washington – where at the end the prosperity suddenly peters out and things go by the board with a resounding crash.
In the year of Uzziah’s death, the Lord commissioned the prophet to go out and warn the people of the wrath to come. “Tell them what a worthless lot they are.” He said, “Tell them what is wrong, and why and what is going to happen unless they have a change of heart and straighten up. Don’t mince matters. Make it clear that they are positively down to their last chance. Give it to them good and strong and keep on giving it to them. I suppose perhaps I ought to tell you,” He added, “that it won’t do any good. The official class and their intelligentsia will turn up their noses at you and the masses will not even listen. They will all keep on in their own ways until they carry everything down to destruction, and you will probably be lucky if you get out with your life.”
Isaiah had been very willing to take on the job – in fact, he had asked for it – but the prospect put a new face on the situation. It raised the obvious question: Why, if all that were so – if the enterprise were to be a failure from the start – was there any sense in starting it? “Ah,” the Lord said, “you do not get the point. There is a Remnant there that you know nothing about. They are obscure, unorganized, inarticulate, each one rubbing along as best he can. They need to be encouraged and braced up because when everything has gone completely to the dogs, they are the ones who will come back and build up a new society; and meanwhile, your preaching will reassure them and keep them hanging on. Your job is to take care of the Remnant, so be off now and set about it.”
II
Apparently, then, if the Lord’s word is good for anything – I do not offer any opinion about that, – the only element in Judean society that was particularly worth bothering about was the Remnant. Isaiah seems finally to have got it through his head that this was the case; that nothing was to be expected from the masses, but that if anything substantial were ever to be done in Judea, the Remnant would have to do it. This is a very striking and suggestive idea; but before going on to explore it, we need to be quite clear about our terms. What do we mean by the masses, and what by the Remnant?
As the word masses is commonly used, it suggests agglomerations of poor and underprivileged people, labouring people, proletarians, and it means nothing like that; it means simply the majority. The mass-man is one who has neither the force of intellect to apprehend the principles issuing in what we know as the humane life, nor the force of character to adhere to those principles steadily and strictly as laws of conduct; and because such people make up the great and overwhelming majority of mankind, they are called collectively the masses. The line of differentiation between the masses and the Remnant is set invariably by quality, not by circumstance. The Remnant are those who by force of intellect are able to apprehend these principles, and by force of character are able, at least measurably, to cleave to them. The masses are those who are unable to do either.
The picture which Isaiah presents of the Judean masses is most unfavorable. In his view, the mass-man – be he high or be he lowly, rich or poor, prince or pauper – gets off very badly. He appears as not only weak-minded and weak-willed, but as by consequence knavish, arrogant, grasping, dissipated, unprincipled, unscrupulous. The mass-woman also gets off badly, as sharing all the mass-man’s untoward qualities, and contributing a few of her own in the way of vanity and laziness, extravagance and foible. The list of luxury-products that she patronized is interesting; it calls to mind the women’s page of a Sunday newspaper in 1928, or the display set forth in one of our professedly “smart” periodicals. In another place, Isaiah even recalls the affectations that we used to know by the name “flapper gait” and the “debutante slouch.” It may be fair to discount Isaiah’s vivacity a little for prophetic fervour; after all, since his real job was not to convert the masses but to brace and reassure the Remnant, he probably felt that he might lay it on indiscriminately and as thick as he liked – in fact, that he was expected to do so. But even so, the Judean mass-man must have been a most objectionable individual, and the mass-woman utterly odious.
If the modern spirit, whatever that may be, is disinclined towards taking the Lord’s word at its face value (as I hear is the case), we may observe that Isaiah’s testimony to the character of the masses has strong collateral support from respectable Gentile authority. Plato lived into the administration of Eubulus, when Athens was at the peak of its jazz-and-paper era, and he speaks of the Athenian masses with all Isaiah’s fervency, even comparing them to a herd of ravenous wild beasts. Curiously, too, he applies Isaiah’s own word remnant to the worthier portion of Athenian society; “there is but a very small remnant,” he says, of those who possess a saving force of intellect and force of character – too small, preciously as to Judea, to be of any avail against the ignorant and vicious preponderance of the masses.
But Isaiah was a preacher and Plato a philosopher; and we tend to regard preachers and philosophers rather as passive observers of the drama of life than as active participants. Hence in a matter of this kind their judgment might be suspected of being a little uncompromising, a little acrid, or as the French say, saugrenu. We may therefore bring forward another witness who was preeminently a man of affairs, and whose judgment can not lie under this suspicion. Marcus Aurelius was ruler of the greatest of empires, and in that capacity he not only had the Roman mass-man under observation, but he had him on his hands twenty-four hours a day for eighteen years. What he did not know about him was not worth knowing and what he thought of him is abundantly attested on almost every page of the little book of jottings which he scribbled offhand from day to day, and which he meant for no eye but his own ever to see.
This view of the masses is the one that we find prevailing at large among the ancient authorities whose writings have come down to us. In the eighteenth century, however, certain European philosophers spread the notion that the mass-man, in his natural state, is not at all the kind of person that earlier authorities made him out to be, but on the contrary, that he is a worthy object of interest. His untowardness is the effect of environment, an effect for which “society” is somehow responsible. If only his environment permitted him to live according to his lights, he would undoubtedly show himself to be quite a fellow; and the best way to secure a more favourable environment for him would be to let him arrange it for himself. The French Revolution acted powerfully as a springboard for this idea, projecting its influence in all directions throughout Europe.
On this side of the ocean a whole new continent stood ready for a large-scale experiment with this theory. It afforded every conceivable resource whereby the masses might develop a civilization made in their own likeness and after their own image. There was no force of tradition to disturb them in their preponderance, or to check them in a thoroughgoing disparagement of the Remnant. Immense natural wealth, unquestioned predominance, virtual isolation, freedom from external interference and the fear of it, and, finally, a century and a half of time – such are the advantages which the mass-man has had in bringing forth a civilization which should set the earlier preachers and philosophers at naught in their belief that nothing substantial can be expected from the masses, but only from the Remnant.
His success is unimpressive. On the evidence so far presented one must say, I think, that the mass-man’s conception of what life has to offer, and his choice of what to ask from life, seem now to be pretty well what they were in the times of Isaiah and Plato; and so too seem the catastrophic social conflicts and convulsions in which his views of life and his demands on life involve him. I do not wish to dwell on this, however, but merely to observe that the monstrously inflated importance of the masses has apparently put all thought of a possible mission to the Remnant out of the modern prophet’s head. This is obviously quite as it should be, provided that the earlier preachers and philosophers were actually wrong, and that all final hope of the human race is actually centred in the masses. If, on the other hand, it should turn out that the Lord and Isaiah and Plato and Marcus Aurelius were right in their estimate of the relative social value of the masses and the Remnant, the case is somewhat different. Moreover, since with everything in their favour the masses have so far given such an extremely discouraging account of themselves, it would seem that the question at issue between these two bodies of opinion might most profitably be reopened.
III
But without following up this suggestion, I wish only, as I said, to remark the fact that as things now stand Isaiah’s job seems rather to go begging. Everyone with a message nowadays is, like my venerable European friend, eager to take it to the masses. His first, last and only thought is of mass-acceptance and mass-approval. His great care is to put his doctrine in such shape as will capture the masses’ attention and interest. This attitude towards the masses is so exclusive, so devout, that one is reminded of the troglodytic monster described by Plato, and the assiduous crowd at the entrance to its cave, trying obsequiously to placate it and win its favour, trying to interpret its inarticulate noises, trying to find out what it wants, and eagerly offering it all sorts of things that they think might strike its fancy.
The main trouble with all this is its reaction upon the mission itself. It necessitates an opportunist sophistication of one’s doctrine, which profoundly alters its character and reduces it to a mere placebo. If, say, you are a preacher, you wish to attract as large a congregation as you can, which means an appeal to the masses; and this, in turn, means adapting the terms of your message to the order of intellect and character that the masses exhibit. If you are an educator, say with a college on your hands, you wish to get as many students as possible, and you whittle down your requirements accordingly. If a writer, you aim at getting many readers; if a publisher, many purchasers; if a philosopher, many disciples; if a reformer, many converts; if a musician, many auditors; and so on. But as we see on all sides, in the realization of these several desires, the prophetic message is so heavily adulterated with trivialities, in every instance, that its effect on the masses is merely to harden them in their sins. Meanwhile, the Remnant, aware of this adulteration and of the desires that prompt it, turn their backs on the prophet and will have nothing to do with him or his message.
Isaiah, on the other hand, worked under no such disabilities. He preached to the masses only in the sense that he preached publicly. Anyone who liked might listen; anyone who liked might pass by. He knew that the Remnant would listen; and knowing also that nothing was to be expected of the masses under any circumstances, he made no specific appeal to them, did not accommodate his message to their measure in any way, and did not care two straws whether they heeded it or not. As a modern publisher might put it, he was not worrying about circulation or about advertising. Hence, with all such obsessions quite out of the way, he was in a position to do his level best, without fear or favour, and answerable only to his august Boss.
If a prophet were not too particular about making money out of his mission or getting a dubious sort of notoriety out of it, the foregoing considerations would lead one to say that serving the Remnant looks like a good job. An assignment that you can really put your back into, and do your best without thinking about results, is a real job; whereas serving the masses is at best only half a job, considering the inexorable conditions that the masses impose upon their servants. They ask you to give them what they want, they insist upon it, and will take nothing else; and following their whims, their irrational changes of fancy, their hot and cold fits, is a tedious business, to say nothing of the fact that what they want at any time makes very little call on one’s resources of prophesy. The Remnant, on the other hand, want only the best you have, whatever that may be. Give them that, and they are satisfied; you have nothing more to worry about. The prophet of the American masses must aim consciously at the lowest common denominator of intellect, taste and character among 120,000,000 people; and this is a distressing task. The prophet of the Remnant, on the contrary, is in the enviable position of Papa Haydn in the household of Prince Esterhazy. All Haydn had to do was keep forking out the very best music he knew how to produce, knowing it would be understood and appreciated by those for whom he produced it, and caring not a button what anyone else thought of it; and that makes a good job.
In a sense, nevertheless, as I have said, it is not a rewarding job. If you can tough the fancy of the masses, and have the sagacity to keep always one jump ahead of their vagaries and vacillations, you can get good returns in money from serving the masses, and good returns also in a mouth-to-ear type of notoriety:
Digito monstrari et dicier, Hic est!
We all know innumerable politicians, journalists, dramatists, novelists and the like, who have done extremely well by themselves in these ways. Taking care of the Remnant, on the contrary, holds little promise of any such rewards. A prophet of the Remnant will not grow purse-proud on the financial returns from his work, nor is it likely that he will get any great renown out of it. Isaiah’s case was exceptional to this second rule, and there are others, but not many.
It may be thought, then, that while taking care of the Remnant is no doubt a good job, it is not an especially interesting job because it is as a rule so poorly paid. I have my doubts about this. There are other compensations to be got out of a job besides money and notoriety, and some of them seem substantial enough to be attractive. Many jobs which do not pay well are yet profoundly interesting, as, for instance, the job of research student in the sciences is said to be; and the job of looking after the Remnant seems to me, as I have surveyed it for many years from my seat in the grandstand, to be as interesting as any that can be found in the world.
IV
What chiefly makes it so, I think, is that in any given society the Remnant are always so largely an unknown quantity. You do not know, and will never know, more than two things about them. You can be sure of those – dead sure, as our phrase is – but you will never be able to make even a respectable guess at anything else. You do not know, and will never know, who the Remnant are, nor what they are doing or will do. Two things you do know, and no more: First, that they exist; second, that they will find you. Except for these two certainties, working for the Remnant means working in impenetrable darkness; and this, I should say, is just the condition calculated most effectively to pique the interest of any prophet who is properly gifted with the imagination, insight and intellectual curiosity necessary to a successful pursuit of his trade.
The fascination and the despair of the historian, as he looks back upon Isaiah’s Jewry, upon Plato’s Athens, or upon Rome of the Antonines, is the hope of discovering and laying bare the “substratum of right-thinking and well-doing” which he knows must have existed somewhere in those societies because no kind of collective life can possibly go on without it. He finds tantalizing intimations of it here and there in many places, as in the Greek Anthology, in the scrapbook of Aulus Gellius, in the poems of Ausonius, and in the brief and touching tribute, Bene merenti, bestowed upon the unknown occupants of Roman tombs. But these are vague and fragmentary; they lead him nowhere in his search for some kind of measure on this substratum, but merely testify to what he already knew a priori – that the substratum did somewhere exist. Where it was, how substantial it was, what its power of self-assertion and resistance was – of all this they tell him nothing.
Similarly, when the historian of two thousand years hence, or two hundred years, looks over the available testimony to the quality of our civilization and tries to get any kind of clear, competent evidence concerning the substratum of right-thinking and well-doing which he knows must have been here, he will have a devil of a time finding it. When he has assembled all he can and has made even a minimum allowance for speciousness, vagueness, and confusion of motive, he will sadly acknowledge that his net result is simply nothing. A Remnant were here, building a substratum like coral insects; so much he knows, but he will find nothing to put him on the track of who and where and how many they were and what their work was like.
Concerning all this, too, the prophet of the present knows precisely as much and as little as the historian of the future; and that, I repeat, is what makes his job seem to me so profoundly interesting. One of the most suggestive episodes recounted in the Bible is that of a prophet’s attempt – the only attempt of the kind on the record, I believe – to count up the Remnant. Elijah had fled from persecution into the desert, where the Lord presently overhauled him and asked what he was doing so far away from his job. He said that he was running away, not because he was a coward, but because all the Remnant had been killed off except himself. He had got away only by the skin of his teeth, and, he being now all the Remnant there was, if he were killed the True Faith would go flat. The Lord replied that he need not worry about that, for even without him the True Faith could probably manage to squeeze along somehow if it had to; “and as for your figures on the Remnant,” He said, “I don’t mind telling you that there are seven thousand of them back there in Israel whom it seems you have not heard of, but you may take My word for it that there they are.”
At that time, probably the population of Israel could not run to much more than a million or so; and a Remnant of seven thousand out of a million is a highly encouraging percentage for any prophet. With seven thousand of the boys on his side, there was no great reason for Elijah to feel lonesome; and incidentally, that would be something for the modern prophet of the Remnant to think of when he has a touch of the blues. But the main point is that if Elijah the Prophet could not make a closer guess on the number of the Remnant than he made when he missed it by seven thousand, anyone else who tackled the problem would only waste his time.
The other certainty which the prophet of the Remnant may always have is that the Remnant will find him. He may rely on that with absolute assurance. They will find him without his doing anything about it; in fact, if he tries to do anything about it, he is pretty sure to put them off. He does not need to advertise for them nor resort to any schemes of publicity to get their attention. If he is a preacher or a public speaker, for example, he may be quite indifferent to going on show at receptions, getting his picture printed in the newspapers, or furnishing autobiographical material for publication on the side of “human interest.” If a writer, he need not make a point of attending any pink teas, autographing books at wholesale, nor entering into any specious freemasonry with reviewers. All this and much more of the same order lies in the regular and necessary routine laid down for the prophet of the masses; it is, and must be, part of the great general technique of getting the mass-man’s ear – or as our vigorous and excellent publicist, Mr. H. L. Mencken, puts it, the technique of boob-bumping. The prophet of the Remnant is not bound to this technique. He may be quite sure that the Remnant will make their own way to him without any adventitious aids; and not only so, but if they find him employing any such aids, as I said, it is ten to one that they will smell a rat in them and will sheer off.
The certainty that the Remnant will find him, however, leaves the prophet as much in the dark as ever, as helpless as ever in the matter of putting any estimate of any kind upon the Remnant; for, as appears in the case of Elijah, he remains ignorant of who they are that have found him or where they are or how many. They did not write in and tell him about it, after the manner of those who admire the vedettes of Hollywood, nor yet do they seek him out and attach themselves to his person. They are not that kind. They take his message much as drivers take the directions on a roadside signboard – that is, with very little thought about the signboard, beyond being gratefully glad that it happened to be there, but with every thought about the directions.
This impersonal attitude of the Remnant wonderfully enhances the interest of the imaginative prophet’s job. Once in a while, just about often enough to keep his intellectual curiosity in good working order, he will quite accidentally come upon some distinct reflection of his own message in an unsuspected quarter. This enables him to entertain himself in his leisure moments with agreeable speculations about the course his message may have taken in reaching that particular quarter, and about what came of it after it got there. Most interesting of all are those instances, if one could only run them down (but one may always speculate about them), where the recipient himself no longer knows where nor when nor from whom he got the message – or even where, as sometimes happens, he has forgotten that he got it anywhere and imagines that it is all a self-sprung idea of his own.
Such instances as these are probably not infrequent, for, without presuming to enroll ourselves among the Remnant, we can all no doubt remember having found ourselves suddenly under the influence of an idea, the source of which we cannot possibly identify. “It came to us afterward,” as we say; that is, we are aware of it only after it has shot up full-grown in our minds, leaving us quite ignorant of how and when and by what agency it was planted there and left to germinate. It seems highly probable that the prophet’s message often takes some such course with the Remnant.
If, for example, you are a writer or a speaker or a preacher, you put forth an idea which lodges in the Unbewußtsein of a casual member of the Remnant and sticks fast there. For some time it is inert; then it begins to fret and fester until presently it invades the man’s conscious mind and, as one might say, corrupts it. Meanwhile, he has quite forgotten how he came by the idea in the first instance, and even perhaps thinks he has invented it; and in those circumstances, the most interesting thing of all is that you never know what the pressure of that idea will make him do.
For these reasons it appears to me that Isaiah’s job is not only good but also extremely interesting; and especially so at the present time when nobody is doing it. If I were young and had the notion of embarking in the prophetical line, I would certainly take up this branch of the business; and therefore I have no hesitation about recommending it as a career for anyone in that position. It offers an open field, with no competition; our civilization so completely neglects and disallows the Remnant that anyone going in with an eye single to their service might pretty well count on getting all the trade there is.
Even assuming that there is some social salvage to be screened out of the masses, even assuming that the testimony of history to their social value is a little too sweeping, that it depresses hopelessness a little too far, one must yet perceive, I think, that the masses have prophets enough and to spare. Even admitting that in the teeth of history that hope of the human race may not be quite exclusively centered in the Remnant, one must perceive that they have social value enough to entitle them to some measure of prophetic encouragement and consolation, and that our civilization allows them none whatever. Every prophetic voice is addressed to the masses, and to them alone; the voice of the pulpit, the voice of education, the voice of politics, of literature, drama, journalism – all these are directed towards the masses exclusively, and they marshal the masses in the way that they are going.
One might suggest, therefore, that aspiring prophetical talent may well turn to another field. Sat patriae Priamoque datum – whatever obligation of the kind may be due the masses is already monstrously overpaid. So long as the masses are taking up the tabernacle of Moloch and Chiun, their images, and following the star of their god Buncombe, they will have no lack of prophets to point the way that leadeth to the More Abundant Life; and hence a few of those who feel the prophetic afflatus might do better to apply themselves to serving the Remnant. It is a good job, an interesting job, much more interesting than serving the masses; and moreover it is the only job in our whole civilization, as far as I know, that offers a virgin field.
—
This essay first appeared in The Atlantic Monthly in 1936. It is from whence the use of the phrase “The Remnant” to describe those who understand the philosophy of liberty began. Edmund Opitz founded a group by the same name.
Albert Jay Nock (1870–1945) was an influential American libertarian author, educational theorist, and social critic. Murray Rothbard was deeply influenced by him, and so was that whole generation of free-market thinkers.
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Tags: Albert Jay Nock, freedom, Remnant
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Liberalism Used to Mean Freedom
Posted by: | CommentsBy Edmund Opitz
John Sholto Douglas was the 8th Marquess of Queensbury, and a noted sportsman as well. “Marquess of Queensbury” has a familiar ring, because in 1867 the Marquess gave his name to a newly devised set of rules to govern prize fighting, rules which are still in force. Prize fighting before the present era — under the old London Rules — was a combination of wrestling and boxing; it was bare knuckle, and a round was called each time a contestant was knocked or thrown to the ground. Under the new Marquess of Queensbury rules the boxers wore padded gloves, and rounds lasted three minutes with a one minute rest between rounds.
Now, it is obvious that these new rules changed the nature of prize fighting, and these changes had a good deal to do with determining the outcome of any particular contest; the old London rules favored the brawler, whereas the athlete who relied on speed and skill had a better chance under the new arrangement. A few, like John L. Sullivan, could win either way! Until Sullivan met Jim Corbett!
Lovers of the manly art used to debate the respective merits of Jack Dempsey versus Joe Louis; who was the greater fighter? The best one can do with a question of this sort is to consult an expert. The expert in this case was Jack Sharkey of Boston, a man who had faced both Dempsey and Louis in the ring, being beaten each time. A sportswriter buttonholed Sharkey and asked, “How about it, Jack; who’s the better man, Dempsey or Louis?” “It all depends,” Sharkey replied. “If the two men fought in the ring, Louis would win. But if the two men fought in a telephone booth, only Dempsey would walk away.”
The rules of a game define its nature, they lay down the conditions for winning, and they go a long way toward determining the outcome of a contest.
The Rules of Life
Life is not a mere game. Living is a lot more complex than any sport, but life and games are analogous in at least one respect: Neither is possible without an appropriate set of rules to be followed. It’s the rule book which determines the character of a game, and no game is even conceivable without one. To throw out the rule book is to forsake the game. By the same token, if we ignore, or deny, or break, or improperly identify, the ethical ground rules for flourishing human life, then the quality of life — individual and social —will decline.
Hoyle’s Games, the rule book for various pastimes, has not changed radically within memory. Which means that you and your opponent may devote your full attention to enjoying the game; none of your energy need be diverted into wondering what the rules are and how they should be applied or altered. Life is different. In life, the rules are always at issue; never more so than at this particular juncture in human affairs, during the final third of the 20th century. It is in the nature of the human condition as such that each generation must test things for itself; no people can passively accept the rule book handed down by its forebears. “What from your father’s heritage is lent,” wrote Goethe, “Earn it anew to really possess it.”
We’re here to think about our lives in society, about the optimum social conditions for bringing out the best in individual potential, about the rules which define economic competition. Peoples of every age in every culture have engaged in similar pursuits, searching for the rules leading to the good life. The rules have been discovered and they’ve been lost; they have been affirmed and they’ve been denied. Rules for the good life, when found, have been systemized as the traditional moral code, whose prescriptions are remarkably alike no matter where on the globe you take a sampling.
Customs and conventions vary widely; but every moral code affirms that it is wrong to betray your friends, wrong to break your word, wrong to injure your neighbor, and so on. Men and women have lived by this code off and on, violating its precepts from time to time, then climbing back on the wagon. Every culture has founded its legal system on the moral code; ethical injunctions against stealing and murder give rise to laws against theft and homicide; rules for personal living beget the rules for living together in society. Thus, such moral and legal guidelines for human action as: injure no man, respect a man’s property, don’t covet his goods, fulfill your contracts, and the like.
If we look within, we discover that we are motivated into action on two distinct levels; individual and social. There’s no way to reduce the complexities of human behavior to one simple motivating force. There are at least two sets of such forces.
Achieving One’s Purpose
On the first level, each of us has his own life to live, his own ends to achieve. The human being is a goal seeking creature, a purposive being. Personal life has a hierarchy of meanings, and each of us finds significance in his own living to the degree that he succeeds in discovering and realizing some of life’s larger purposes. One such large purpose is to find a sense of achievement in a chosen occupation or profession; if genuine satisfaction is lacking here the deficiency can hardly be made up elsewhere. There’s a profound truth in H. L. Mencken’s observation that the great division among mankind is between those who enjoy their work and those who don’t.
Now, in addition to this major thrust in individual life most people have some hobby which stimulates a sense of accomplishment — like tennis, or bridge, or music, or woodworking. And then there are the lesser goals, of the New Year’s resolution variety; like learning a new skill, acquiring a second language, losing five pounds by Labor Day, and so on.
It is obvious that some societies give you more scope and elbow room for the realization of your assorted goals than do other societies; you have a better chance to express the various facets of your nature in New York than in Moscow. The freer the society the more opportunity for individual self-expression; by definition this is the case. Your freedom increases as more and more of your life is self-directed rather than other-directed. If your life is at the disposal of other people you are not free — even if these other people are organized as government and even if you voted for them; you are not free if they are managing or directing your affairs!
It is a deeply rooted set of motivations which impels each one of us to take charge of his own life, the better to realize our personal goals. The relevant considerations here, at this level, have to do with human nature and destiny, that is, with psychology and philosophy. People who do not know what to do with their lives should seek out a spiritual advisor; or a psychiatrist, if they are ill.
Most people are moderately successful at this business of living their lives, and those who reflect on the matter realize that they cannot live their personal lives in isolation. We cannot function fully as persons unless we interact with some society. Even Robinson Crusoe had the language and culture of England with him on his island, plus some tools and a Bible. And here we come to a second set of motivations, a spin-off from the first. Your primary incentive is to achieve your personal goals, but a related incentive is work for those social conditions which maximize the opportunities for you —and everyone else — to achieve personal goals. The relevant considerations at this level are in the domain of political and economic philosophy.
You have certain basic instincts, and these primordial drives will see to it that you live your own life; but the assumption of personal responsibility for strengthening and enlarging the structures of freedom in our society is a voluntary action undertaken by a comparative few. Those who do act at this level are prompted by a sense of moral obligation. But moral obligation is weak in our society, so there are lots of dropouts at this level; there are people who demand all the advantages a free society has to offer, but who make no contribution to freedom in return. When Ortega y Gasset wrote his book, The Revolt of the Masses, in 1932, he put these dropouts in the category of mass man.
Ortega’s Mass Man
Ortega used the term “mass man,” or “the masses” in a very special sense; he did not mean the poor, the illiterate, the uneducated, those who work with their hands. I suspect Ortega would say that there are more mass men per square inch on the faculties of our great universities than exist in any typical farming community of Middle America. Mass man is the rootless intellectual, detached from his community and out of step with his country’s history. Such a man is unable to trace the connection between effort and reward in society, and, convinced of his own superiority he’s bitter because lesser folk refuse to give him his due.
Mass men “are only concerned with their own well-being,” Ortega writes, “and at the same time they remain alien to the cause of that well-being. As they do not see, behind the benefits of civilization, marvels of invention and construction which can only be maintained by great effort and foresight, they imagine that their role is limited to demanding these benefits peremptorily as if they were natural rights.” Mass man, “finding himself in a world so excellent, technically and socially, believes that it has been produced by nature, and never thinks of the personal efforts of highly endowed individuals which the creation of this new world presupposed.” (Revolt, pp. 65 and 63)
A culture — as the name tells us — is something cultivated; it is inspired by human imagination and vision, it demands hard work and sacrifice to bring it into being and to sustain it. No society or civilization “just is” — as nature “just is.” Societies come and go; civilizations rise and fall. Arnold Toynbee counts some 21 powerful empires which once held sway over portions of the earth and millions of people but which are no more. It is obvious, therefore, that barbarism, or a dull and vegetative existence, is the rule of mankind; whereas civilization — a society where there is maximum opportunity for achieving the human potential — is the exception.
The good society, where people enjoy liberty and order and are stimulated to pursue their personal goals, doesn’t just happen —it is a contingent thing, that is, it depends on preceding events or situations. Good health is likewise a contingent thing; you cannot enjoy optimum physical well-being on just any old terms. Assuming normal heredity, good health is contingent upon proper diet, rest and exercise — and the good luck to avoid accidents and noxious foreign bodies. Are there analogous rules for a good society, that is, conditions which must be met if we are to retain present liberties, and use them to expand the areas of life where people ought to be freer than now to pursue their peaceful goals?
The Good Society
Many of our contemporaries believe that there is a simple answer to this question. You want the society to move in the direction of greater freedom? Extend the franchise, lower the voting age, get people interested in the electoral process; and then make sure they cast their ballots. This is the meaning of democracy, and democracy means freedom. A truly democratic society, they would continue, is one where the government is totally responsive to the popular will. Government, in this view, belongs to The People, and The People is entitled to get from the government whatever a majority of them demand from it. If there are troubles in society these days — which nobody denies — the cause is not democracy, it is too little democracy; government is not responsive enough to The People. Therefore, such persons conclude, the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy! I’ll insert here a sage comment of Hegel: “The People is that part of the nation which knows what it wants!”
Now, it is not difficult to see how this 20th century democratic dogma came to have the hold it has on people of our time. Go back a few hundred years. In the early 1600’s, James the First of England proclaimed that he ruled by divine right. There was mounting rebellion against this idea, and by 1689 Parliament had gained ascendancy; it issued a Declaration of Rights and offered the crown of England to William and Mary. From that time on, the kings of England were no longer its rulers. By the 20th century, kingship had been phased out in nearly every country, to be replaced by presidents and parliaments. Power seemed to be exercised more and more by The People, and so this political movement which toppled the kings has been described as the march of democracy.
Take careful note of the fact that the democratic movement—in both theory and practice — has to do with the sanctions undergirding political action, with the authority back of whatever government does. Rulers of an earlier period when asked to justify a particular course of political action might say that they were exercising God’s will, or that the moral law mandated their actions, or the law of the land, or custom. The justification, or the excuse, for any governmental action under a democratic regime, is that The People demand it — the rulers are merely carrying out the popular will. The People are sovereign under a democracy; that’s where the buck stops. God or The Law would be acknowledged as sovereign under the early theory.
The Nature of Government
Now governmental action is what it is, no matter what sanction might be offered to justify what it does. The nature of government remains the same even though its sponsorship be changed. Government always acts with power; in the last resort government uses force to back up its decrees. Government is unique among all the organizations and institutions of a society; the government of a society is its police power, and the nature of government remains the same, regardless of the auspices under which a government acts.
Americans are justly proud of our nation, but this pride sometimes blinds us to reality. How often have you heard someone declare, “In America, ‘We’ are the government.” This assertion is demonstrably untrue; “We” are the society, all 210 million of us; but society and government are not at all the same entity. Society is all-of-us, whereas government is only some-of-us. The some-of-us who comprise government would begin with the President, Vice-President, and Cabinet; it would include Congress and the bureaucracy; it would descend through governors, mayors and lesser officials, down to sheriffs and the cop on the beat.
Now, what is the distinguishing characteristic of the people in the categories I have just enumerated, the people who comprise government? Are they more wicked than other men? Well, to hear some people talk one would think so —people whose idea of political science is to faithfully collect instances of venality and stupidity in public office. These have their counterpart among the liberals, whose idea of high level economic discussion is to tell tales about venal and stupid businessmen. There are many able and high minded men in public life, just as there are good people in business. The distribution of good and bad is pretty much the same in every walk of life. There may be room for debate here, but little is gained by sitting in moral judgment on whole classes of people.
A Monopoly of Force
Government is unique among the institutions of society, in that society has bestowed upon this one agency a legal monopoly of the weaponry, from clubs to H bombs. Governments do use persuasion, and they do rely on authority, legitimacy and tradition — but so do other institutions like the Church and the School. But only one agency has the power to tax, the authority to operate the system of courts and jails, and a warrant for mobilizing the machinery for making war; that is government, the power structure.
Machiavelli used to say that only the usurper can understand the realities of power. The eldest son on whom the king’s mantle falls peacefully thinks of his power in terms of pomp and display; but power to the usurper means plotting, intrigue, bribery, poison and the dagger.
The point to be stressed is that the essential nature of government — its license to resort to force at some point — is not changed by merely altering the warrant under which it acts. Divine right or popular sovereignty — it makes no difference to this point. Government is as government does.
The march of democracy which we have been discussing was paralleled by the freedom movement in England and America during the same period. The idea of individual liberty was given a tremendous boost by the Reformation and the Renaissance. The earliest manifestation of this new-found liberty was in the area of religion, issuing in the conviction that a person should be allowed to worship God in his own way. This religious ferment in England gave us Puritanism, and early in the 17th century Puritanism projected a political movement whose members were contemptuously called Whiggamores — a word roughly equivalent to “cattle thieves.” The king’s men were called Tories —”highway robbers.” The Whigs worked for individual liberty and progress; the Tories defended the old orders of the king, the landed aristocracy, and the established church.
Early Step to Freedom
One of the great writers and thinkers in the Puritan and Whig tradition was John Milton, who wrote his celebrated plea for the abolition of Parliamentary censorship of printed material in 1644, Areopagitica. Many skirmishes had to be fought before Freedom of the Press was finally accepted as one of the earmarks of a free society. Free Speech is a corollary of press freedom, and I need do no more than remind you of the statement attributed to Voltaire: “I disagree with everything you say, but I will defend with my life your right to say it.”
Adam Smith extended freedom to the economic order, with The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776 and warmly received in the thirteen colonies. Our population numbered about 3 million at this time; roughly one third of these were Loyalists, that is, Tory in outlook, and besides, there was a war on. Despite these circumstances 2500 sets of The Wealth of Nations were sold in the colonies within five years of its publication. The colonists had been practicing economic liberty for a long time, simply because their governments were too busy with other things to interfere — or too inefficient. Adam Smith simply provided a rational and a philosophical justification for what the colonists were already doing. These people knew in their bones, as Jefferson put it, that “If government should tell us when to sow and when to reap, we’d all want for bread.”
Ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted in 1791. Article the First reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” America has never had a heresy law, and the First Amendment promises that we will not have a national church — the implication being that a man’s deepest convictions are too important a matter to be entrusted to politicians. The separation of Church and State enunciated in the First Amendment was a momentous first step in world history. That step is implicit in Christianity and has been foreshadowed as far back as 494 in a letter of Pope Gelasius to the Byzantine Emperior Anastasius, in which the sacred and the secular were sharply delineated, but circumstances decreed that the final implementation should wait till the 18th century.
I have called your attention to two paralled movements; the march of Democracy which deposed the kings and gave “power to the people,” and the movement to expand individual liberty which gave us freedom of religion, freedom of economic enterprise, freedom of the press, and free speech. This second movement was rooted in the religious reforms of Queen Elizabeth’s day and led to political reforms designed to expand individual liberty. This was the major thrust of Whiggery.
The men we refer to as the Founding Fathers would have called themselves Whigs. Edmund Burke was the chief spokesman for a group in Parliament known as The Rockingham Whigs. In 1832 the Whig Party changed its name to one which more aptly described its emphasis on liberty. It became the Liberal Party, standing for free trade, religious liberty, the abolition of slavery, extension of the franchise, and other reforms. This development of ideas on liberty from Queen Elizabeth to Queen Victoria might properly be called the movement of Liberalism — Classical Liberalism.
Classical Liberalism
Democracy and Liberalism have had a parallel history of development since the 17th Century, and some thinkers have ably championed both — one as means, the other as end. They are sufficiently close historically so that it is easy to confuse the two; but they are sufficiently different so that such confusion breeds dangerous consequences. Liberalism and Democracy are related as end and means. The end is a free society where people have the opportunity for the fullest expression of their lives. This is Liberalism. A suitable mechanics for the attainment of this end is to abandon the heredity principle which gave us kings and allow the multitudes to vote for officeholders. This is Democracy, a means, whose end is the free society of Liberalism, Classical Liberalism.
We need to remind ourselves that there are two major political questions, not just one. Everyone who thinks about the philosophy of government must first thrash out the question: “What shall be the extent of rule?” That’s the old way of putting it; we’d phrase the question somewhat differently today. We’d ask: “What is the role of a government in our society?” or “What activities belong in the public sector?” or “In the light of government’s nature, what is its competence? What tasks should we assign to it?” Men who wrestled with these questions, or questions like them, gave us the philosophy of Classical Liberalism, which — I scarcely need remind you — is the exact opposite of what today parades as liberalism.
We are familiar today with the division of society into a public sector and a private sector. The former might be called the political or coercive sector, and the latter, the voluntary or free choice sector. To the public or political sector we assign those things which we believe cannot operate without coercion, things which need to be managed, controlled, regulated, quarterbacked, commanded. To this sector our ancestors consigned religion, publishing, public discourse, and economic action. But the ideas of Liberalism, gaining a hold on public opinion, released these four major human activities from bondage to the state.
There is a second political question, of much less consequence than the first. It has to do with choice of personnel: how do you select people for public office? This is the question to which democratic theorists addressed themselves, and the answer that Democracy gives to this question of choosing people for political position is: Vote! Democratic theorists, having examined the arguments for monarchy, for aristocracy, and for drawing lots, come out in favor of balloting. Lay down a few requirements for the privilege of holding public office, and for the privilege of voting, then — on a given day and place —let the qualified voters mark their X or pull the lever, and the person who gets the highest number of votes gets the job.
If these words were used in their proper and original sense, I would call myself a Liberal Democrat. I am a Liberal in wanting government to act only as such action expands the domain of liberty for all persons alike; and I am a Democrat in wanting the franchise wisely extended — provided that the vote is simply to choose this person or that to occupy public office in a properly limited government.
Some of our forebears in the 18th century entertained what they called the “stake-in-government” theory. This was the notion that voting should be limited to property holders; otherwise, those without property would use their power at the polls to loot the treasury of money that had first been taxed away from those who earned it. These fears were groundless at the time; in the first place, because almost everyone in the new nation was a property holder and, in the second place, the public treasury did not have enough in it to make looting worth while.
But the very existence of this theory indicates that some people of the period rejected the idea that government should be an agency for the transfer of funds from one set of pockets to another. This was a rejection of the principle of “redistributionism,” on which all modern governments operate. Repudiation of the idea, that the state exists to advantage some at the expense of others, is the major thrust of Classical Liberalism. “Justice is the end of government,” wrote James Madison in the 51st Federalist Paper. “It is the end of civil society.”
The unforgivable sin — so far as Classical Liberal theory is concerned — is the use of public power for private ends. Present-day liberalism, by contrast, invariably boils down to: Somebody’s program at everyone’s expense. These two aphorisms are more than mere slogans, and in order to bring out their meaning let’s take an imaginary trip to Berlin.
Forms of Collectivism
The year is 1927. You are strolling around the streets on a pleasant evening in May. You spy a small group of people gathered around a soapboxer wearing a red shirt. You listen awhile, but your German is not quite good enough to pick up the details of the excited harangue. So when the speaker has finished and the crowd has dispersed, you buttonhole the man and ask him what he’s up to. “I’m a member of the Communist Party,” he tells you, “and as soon as we obtain power, this is the program we are going to impose on Germany.” And he proceeds to spell out for you the social pattern he wants to enforce.
You continue your stroll and encounter a similar group of people listening to a spell-binder in a brown shirt. After the speech is over you ask this man to identify himself and he tells you he is a spokesman for the German National Socialist Workers’ Party —Nazi for short. He outlines the program his party will impose on Germany once they come to power, and you note that the Nazi program is almost indistinguishable from the Communist program; both eliminate individual liberty, both centralize power in the hands of a monolithic party, both oppose the market economy, both politicalize education, and both seek to eliminate or domesticate religion. The fact that Communists and Nazis fought each other in the streets does not mean that they opposed each other philosophically. In the Wars of Religion, Christians fought Christians, although the matters on which they agreed seem to us today, looking back, far more extensive than the points on which they differed.
Self-Government
You continue your stroll and finally come across a speaker dressed rather quaintly and addressing his tiny audience in measured, academic tones. When the man finishes his discourse you fall into conversation with him and learn that he and several friends in Berlin have a study group which reads and discusses the works of Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, and — to your utter amazement — The Federalist Papers! You are so fascinated that you can hardly wait to hear this man’s program for Germany. “We have no program for the nation,” he tells you. “It is our belief that people, either individually, or working through voluntary associations, can plan their actions better than these can be planned for them by the centralized power structure. Like your Mr. Madison, in the 39th Federalist Paper, we rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.”
Classical Liberalism is unlike any other political theory. Every other political philosophy contemplates a National Plan, a program to put people through their paces. Your choice at the polls, then, is between this set of people with their XYZ Plan for the nation; versus that set of people with their ABC Plan for the nation. What choice does this offer for the ordinary citizen who’s injuring no one, who just wants to live his own life in peace with his neighbors, and who does not want to plan other people’s lives? The answer is: No choice at all!
I have described the movement of Liberalism from the 17th to the 19th centuries as an effort to expand the boundaries of individual liberty. How? By curbing the power of governments to diminish the efficacy of personal choice in the major areas of life. “The history of liberty,” said Woodrow Wilson in 1912, “is the history of the limitations placed upon governmental power.”
Now, when you address yourself to the question of the proper role of a government within a society you are dealing with an issue loaded with intellectual and moral content. “What is the competence of government?” and “What circumstances in society render it necessary to bring legal coercion to bear?” are questions you have to wrestle with, argue about, debate, write books on. They are of the same nature as disputed and difficult questions in history, psychology, archeology, or any other discipline. Most certainly, they are questions of a different nature than “Do you prefer ice cream to apple pie?”
The Limits for Voting
In simple matters of personal preference the opinion poll is a means of getting statistics. Some people find such figures valuable, and so we keep poll takers in business. Professional samplers of public opinion keep a running profile of changing voter preference for the presidential race of 1976. The balloting which will take place next year is the same kind of a thing as a Gallup poll; it will be a measure of popular preference for Mr. Ford over Mr. Jackson —or whoever. Voting is little more than a popularity contest, and the most popular man is not necessarily the best man, nor is the most popular idea the soundest idea. Balloting, then, is a means for dealing with the second, and much less important of the two political questions: “Who shall hold public office?”
It is obvious, now, that balloting is not a way to get at the fundamental question of the proper function of government in a society. We have to think hard about this one, which means we have to assemble evidence; weigh, sift, and criticize it; compare notes with colleagues, and so on. Which means that this is an educational endeavor; a matter for the classroom, the library, the study, the podium, the pulpit, the forum, the press. Mr. Gallup has no place here; to count noses at this point is a cop out. Furthermore, it is obvious that we cannot possibly arrive at sound conclusions about the role a government should play in a society unless we base our political speculations upon a solid understanding of our own nature, and the place of man in the total scheme of things.
If man is “little more than a chance deposit on the surface of the world, carelessly thrown up between two ice ages by the same forces that rust iron and ripen corn,” as the famous historian Carl Becker put it, then it’s a matter of almost total indifference what kind of social and political arrangements we have — so long as we are comfortable and well fed, and no one steals our security blanket. But if we truly assess the greatness of the human spirit — as witnessed by man’s aspirations and his achievements in religion, art, philosophy, music, literature, law, as well as in the building of great civilizations — then we know that our three-score-years-and-ten are a moment in eternity, whose opportunities are offered us once and never repeated. So what we do with our earthly pilgrimage is a thing of utmost importance; and one thing we must do in life is work on the institutions of our society so as to widen the scope for individual persons to fulfill their potential.
Body and Mind
Human nature has several facets; every one of us is compounded of at least three elements. Biological factors are evident in our make-up; we are mammals and we are bipeds. This aspect of our nature is so obvious that some have been led to believe, erroneously, that this is all we are. The visible part of us is material, the physical body, which is stamped with our uniqueness. No one can grow fingerprints like yours. Body type — whether tall and slim or short and wide — has something to do with the shaping of our total personality and our greater susceptibility to certain diseases; but this is not what makes us distinctively human, Our anatomy by itself does not produce our language, and without a language we’d have no words to express our thoughts and our thoughts would be exceedingly primitive.
Language and thought are the marks of the second component in our nature, the mind. The body can be trained but only the mind can be educated. Mind and body interact, but their relations are so subtle as to puzzle the greatest of philosophers. Your mind, too, is uniquely your own. Mind and body together form your “psychosome,” and when the two are out of phase you have a psychosomatic illness.
Cultural Components
Now, in addition to your mind and body combination, there is a third essential ingredient that goes into making up the Self you are. Your psychosome receives an infusion of cultural components. If your particular psychosome had been born in Calcutta, say, or Peking, you would be a different person than the Self you actually are, despite the fact that your psychosome would be identical in each case. Your genes are undeniably important in the shaping of your nature; they make you a clever animal with enormous latent learning ability. But in addition to your genetic endowment you have a cultural heredity; there’s a little bit of some society in every Self. And the society which is in each one of us is compounded of the language, the traditions, the customs, conventions and laws of the West — not of the Orient, or Africa, or Oceana. To acknowledge that we are nurtured in the world vision of the West is not to pass an adverse judgment on other cultures; it’s simply to say that theirs is not ours. Incidentally, only those who are securely rooted in their own heritage can sense the true inwardness of other cultures.
In short, you would not be you if your Self were the product of another culture. Subtract the products of this culture from your make-up and you would be a clever anthropoid — nothing more. This is point one.
Every living organism proclaims by its continuing existence that life is to be preferred over death. Schopenhauer professed to believe otherwise; he declared for pessimism and preached that life is not worth living — until he died of natural causes at 72! Some do give up on life, too many; others cling to a wretched existence. A few discover real zest and joy in living. But anything this side of the despairing gesture of suicide constitutes an affirmation that it is better to be alive than dead. Point two.
Point three merely voices the obvious; the only life you have to live is the one you are living now in this place — this town, this state, this nation — at this time in history. Your citizenship is a thing of great value which people of other nations are willing to pay a high price to obtain. Living here you receive a greater economic reward for less effort than your counterpart in other parts of the globe; your rights are less in jeopardy than his, you have more latitude than he in pursuing your personal goals, you are freer in your hourly and daily rounds.
The human aim is not simply to live, it is to live well. The Self you want to preserve is ineluctably linked to the culture which went into its formation — our culture. Transplant your Self to an alien culture, and while it might survive it surely would not flourish. Stimulating interaction with your native habitat — with twentieth century America — provides optimal conditions for a flourishing life for yourself. Self-preservation — the first law — implies, therefore, an alert concern for the health of the values embodied in our culture. To the extent that a person respects the life that is in him, to that extent will he seek to preserve and strengthen the social matrix in which he was cast. If the nation as a whole appears to be beyond redemption or turns hostile, then the people who cherish sound values will produce a subculture within it; they’ll become a Remnant. The Amish are an example of such a culture within a culture, and so are the Mormons.
Respect for one’s Self and its values develops solicitude for the institutions which support them, and generates a willingness to defend those institutions. Self-rejection, on the other hand, alienates a person from his native culture and leads to antagonism toward the society which produced that Self. Disorder within is projected as strife without.
Two Aspects of Culture
There are two things to be said about a culture. In the first place, a culture is something cultivated; it’s not nature, but it might be called our second nature, for what we absorb from our social environment transforms a clever animal into a human being. We are humanized by what we learn in the educational process — by what we get from our parents, from our peers, from books, and from the prevailing intellectual climate by a sort of osmosis. In the second place, our culture is a transmission belt linking the generations, connecting those long dead with those not yet born. We acquired our values from our ancestors and, in a sense, made them our own; and we will pass these values along to our children, and they, in turn, to their descendents.
There are individuals and organizations in our midst whose announced aim is to destroy our society. They profess to hate the values of Western civilization, so they want to burn it down, blow it up — or talk it to death! Now, there is a large measure of self-hatred in these people who turn against civilized values; their dislike of themselves is externalized as a lust to tear down the culture which has shaped — or misshaped — them into what they are. Instead of destroying that which they hate — themselves — directly, by suicide, they seek to subvert the society responsible for making them misfits.
But if we accept ourselves, with all our shortcomings, as the Selves we really are — body and mind plus cultural components — then we have an obligation to defend body and mind and also the society whose values are selectively in our very being, with every resource of reason, persuasion, example and — in desperate last resort situations — by force.
Western civilization is grounded in the elements of civilization itself, to which it adds things unique to the West. The fundamental social value in Western civilization is individual liberty. The human person is looked upon as God’s creature who must be free if he is to fulfill his duty toward his Maker. This is the theological conviction which, on the political plane, spills out into the free economy and limited government. When the law preserves freedom of personal action, within the rules for maximizing liberty and opportunity for everyone, then government — so conceived — is the necessary prop to the free society.
I began this paper with some references to prize fighting, often referred to as “the manly art of self-defense.” Now, we do not expect teachers of boxing, or judo, or karate to use language with due regard to semantic accuracy. When they say “self-defense” they really mean “body defense.” They do not teach you how to defend your mind from invasion by logical fallacies, nor are they concerned with the protection of the cultural elements in our make-up. Self-defense, literally, must operate at these three levels: body, mind, and culture.
We expect more precision in the use of language from social scientists and philosophers, but we seldom get it. For the past century and a half political theorists have talked about man’s right of self-defense when they meant no more than a presumed right to protect his material body and his property— his property being merely an extension of his body. It is altogether right that a person defend his body from injury and his property from invasion, but a careful use of language demands that we label this “body-defense” and “defense of property”; it is grossly inaccurate to speak of defending one-third of our Self as “self-defense.” We admit as much in the word “bodyguard.”
The Bodyguard’s Role
You hire some burly and aggressive young man to see to it that unwelcome hands are kept off your carcass; he also sees to it that no one steals your car or breaks into your house. He guards your body and its material extension as property, but what about the other two parts of your Self — your mind and the cultural components in your make-up? It is not a function of your bodyguard to fortify your mind against falsehoods and specious reasoning, nor do we expect a bodyguard to buttress the values which undergird the free society. Concern for things of the mind and for cultural values are not part of his job as a bodyguard. But a genuine understanding of the Self leads to a realization that the defense of the Self demands more than any mere bodyguard can supply. It demands a proper concern for the requirements of liberty and justice in society.
The bodyguard offers his protective service on the market; he has a price tag. The market is perfectly competent to handle anything to which a price tag may appropriately be affixed. A synonym for “the market economy” is, in fact, “the price system.” The price system covers that sector of life where things are offered for exchange and sale, where a quid pro quo is expected; 69¢ for a loaf of bread, a hundred dollars for a suit, ten thousand dollars for a year’s work, and so on.
The price system or the market economy is the only sensible way to handle matters in the sector of life where things and services are offered in exchange; this is the realm of economic calculation, where things can be reduced to monetary units. But there is a realm beyond the realm of monetary computation, where things do not have a price tag. Justice belongs to this realm, and so do such moral goods as liberty, honor, love and friendship.
If justice is for sale it is not justice; as we acknowledge in such old gags as “Hizzoner is the best judge money can buy.” Honor is beyond price; if you can buy it it’s not honor. “What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?” Or freedom. Can you put a price tag on it? Could you take the 1975 national budget and use it to buy us a free society? Could we use our gold and buy packages of freedom in carload lots until the free economy is established? Take love. If it’s for sale it’s not love. You may be able to earn love, but you cannot buy it. A man who throws money around may acquire a group of so-called friends, but no one believes this to be the way to achieve real friendship.
Beyond Monetary Computation
There is a realm of life beyond the realm of monetary computation, where we find such goods as justice, liberty, honor, love and friendship. Two of these several goods are of immediate concern to political philosophy: justice and liberty. Justice is giving every man his due; justice provides “a free field and no favor.” Justice is equal treatment before the law; one law for all men alike because all are one in their essential human nature. A just society is one which offers maximum liberty for all persons. Justice cannot be measured in monetary terms, and the same is true of liberty; no price tag may appropriately be affixed to either justice or liberty. This takes them out of the economic realm, for the market is incompetent to handle those things which cannot be priced.
It is obvious that honor, love and friendship are likewise without price — which takes them out of the economic realm. But neither can they be enforced — which takes them out of the political realm. But justice can be enforced. It is right that an act of violence against person or property be repelled or redressed forcibly. The rules which maximize individual liberty in society are occasionally infracted, and these aggressive or criminal actions must be counteracted by force, in last-resort situations.
This legal employment of force to rectify violence is the task of justice, and the only agency competent in the circumstances is government — for two primary reasons. I’ve already touched upon one, the fact that justice has no price tag, which takes it out beyond the market place. In the second place, the market is wholly peaceful; there is no force involved in producing economic goods, nor is there force in the network of voluntary exchanges which follows. Obviously, then, a wholly peaceful institution is incompetent to allocate acts of force. Only the political agency is competent to perform this necessary function in society, and when government performs competently within the limits imposed by the nature of its tasks, then individual liberty is maximized.
Liberalism Means Freedom
Liberalism used to mean freedom. Classical liberalism performed mightily and achieved major breakthroughs in the area of worship, free speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of economic enterprise. Then despotism returned and liberalism betrayed itself. We have been losing our liberties under the delusion that the democratic and majoritarian political process would automatically secure them! Several generations were misled into believing that once The People were in power, society would be free. The result is twentieth century totalitarianism masquerading as The People’s Republic of this or that Communist nation, where power is wielded arbitrarily and with utter ruthlessness.
We now know that people do propel themselves along the road to serfdom by majority vote, and we see that those who have voted themselves into slavery are just as much slaves as those who have been put in bondage by a conqueror. Power is power, whether sanctioned by divine right or authorized by the popular will. Power is not liberty; liberty operates in another dimension and has other requirements. As soon as a significant number of people become aware of these requirements, Liberalism will again mean freedom.
Originally published in The Freeman, December 1975.
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